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Kiwara-Wilson: Restituting Colonial Plunder: The Case for the Benin Bronzes and

RESTITUTING COLONIAL PLUNDER:
THE CASE FOR THE BENIN BRONZES AND
IVORIES
Africa needs not only apology and forgiveness, but
that these priceless African cultural treasures artworks, icons, relics - be returned to their rightful
owners... . [T]he African art that has found its way
into the galleries of former European colonial
powers and the homes of the rich in North America,
Europe, and elsewhere has deep cultural
significance. These works form an integral part of
defining our identity and personality as family, as
African family. We talk to them. They talk to us.
We touch them at certain moments of our lives,
from birth through life to death. It is through them
that the living spirits of our people, of our history,
of our culture interact and interface with us. They
are not there, hence the void in our minds and in
our hearts. We continue to cry for them to come
back home, to complete that cultural, spiritual
space.
-Theo-Ben Gurirab'
Ce qu'il ne pardonne pas a Hitler, ce n'est pas le
crime en soi, le crime contre 1'homme, ce n'est pas
l'humiliation de l'homme en soi, c'est le crime
contre l'homme blanc, c'est l'humiliation de
l'homme blanc, et d'avoir appliqu6 d l'Europe des
proc6d6s colonialistes dont ne relevaient jusqu'ici
que les Arabes d'Alg6rie, les coolies de l'Inde et les
nigres d'Afrique.
-Aim6 C6saire2

1. CLAIMING THE STONES, NAMING THE BONES: CULTURAL PROPERTY AND
THE NEGOTIATION OF NATIONAL AND ETHNIC IDENTITY 1 (Elazar Barkan et al.

eds., 2003).

375
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To tear treasure out of the bowels of the land was
their desire, with no more moral purpose at the back
of it than there is in burglars breaking into a safe.
-Joseph Conrad'
INTRODUCTION

Britain's African empire in the nineteenth century was both
extensive and ruthless. The empire was responsible not only for
the colonies' loss of minerals and land, but also for the subjugation
of the local people. In many cases, this included the looting and
transfer of the colonized people's cultural property to Britain.
Looting was an economic tool, but it was also a means for the
colonial power to assert dominance over the colonized people
through erasing cultural identity and instilling a sense of inferiority
among the subjugated. In these ways, the colonial treatment of
African people was similar to the Nazi treatment of Jewish people
during the Holocaust. Because of these similarities, the principles
that justify the restitution of Nazi-looted art may similarly justify
the restitution of cultural property to former colonized states. This
paper seeks to explore this thesis by focusing on the Benin
bronzes, which can be traced back to the 1897 British punitive
expedition and which are currently held in American collections.
The first section of this paper outlines the historical background of
the Benin Kingdom and its invasion by the British in 1897
following the Benin massacre. The second section explores the
moral and ethical considerations of the restitution debate, and the
historical stance on spoils of war under international law in the
nineteenth century. The final section of this paper discusses what
legal standing, if any, the descendants of the original Kingdom of
Benin royal family would have in a judicial proceeding in the

2. "What he cannot forgive Hitler for, is not the crime in itself, the crime
against man, it is not the humiliation of man himself it is the crime against the
white man, the humiliation of the white man, and that he applied to Europe
colonialist procedures which until then had been reserved for the Arabs of
Algeria, the coolies of India, and the niggers of Africa." AMIM CSAIRE,
DISCOURS SUR LE COLONIALISME 14 (1955). Translated by author.
3. JOSEPH CONRAD, HEART OF DARKNESS 32 (2008).
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United States; this section also analyzes the legal rules that would
be applicable in such a proceeding. The conclusion of this paper
presents a suggestion for the resolution of the restitution debate
that might be beneficial to all parties.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. Kingdom ofBenin

The old Kingdom of Benin extended over the area that is now
Edo state in modem day Nigeria.' According to Benin oral
history, Benin City-the heart of the Kingdom of Benin-was
founded in "mythological times" by the Ogiso rulers, the first royal
dynasty of Benin.' The kingdom was led by an oba, or king, a
holder of a hereditary title who was believed to be divine.' From
the fifteenth century, the kingdom was ruled mainly by warrior
kings who developed their power base through concrete control
over a strong military machine.'
However, towards the
seventeenth century, civil strife began to seriously weaken the
kingdom.' The weakening may be attributable to the change in the
rules of royal succession in 1610, after the oba died without issue
and without any brothers to replace him, allowing his indirect
descendants to take the throne.' A power struggle for the kingship
ensued, coupled with a belief that the oba was no longer divinely
ordained, which undermined the people's support of his
leadership. 0
Another important arm of the political structure in Benin was the
office of the chief. Chiefs were appointed at the oba's pleasure
4.

BENIN: KINGS AND RITUALS: COURT ARTS FROM NIGERIA

Plakensteiner, ed., 2007).
5. Id.
6. PAULA GIRSCHICK

BEN-AMos,

ART, INNOVATION,

23 (Barbara

AND POLITICS IN

EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY BENIN 30 (1999). In this paper, "oba" refers generally to

the position of king, while "Oba" refers to the particular king who ruled in the
year of the Benin Massacre.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 33.
9. Id. at 36-37.
10. Id. at 37.
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and did not pass their title on to their children." One particular
chieftain position, that of the iyase, or war chief, held great power
and influence. 2 As a result, there was often conflict between the
obas and the iyase." By the late seventeenth century, the iyase and
other chiefs had grown very powerful; the selection procedure for
the king now included a confirmation by the iyase.14 As the oba
grappled with the infighting of the seventeenth century power
struggles, he became less engaged in military attacks, which
allowed the position of the iyase to grow even stronger. 5 The
extent of the chiefs' growing political power could be seen in the
deliberations that led to the attack on the British vice counsel
James Phillips' party. The lyase played a pivotal role in the
decision to attack the British party."
Despite the internal strife, the kingdom was generally very
prosperous, reaching a golden age in the fifteenth century." As
with other successful warrior states in Africa, the prosperity of the
fifteenth and sixteenth century encouraged artistic exploration.
One of the hallmarks of the kingdom's art was the royally
commissioned brass works, which have come to be known as the
Benin bronzes. Generally, property ownership was reserved for
some social classes, and only the oba could own brass objects."
These brass works served as a pictorial record of the history of the
kingdom.20 Many of the plaques produced therefore depict
numerous themes, including war and trade with the Portuguese. 2'

11. Id. at 31.
12. BEN-AMos, supra note 6, at 33. In this paper, "iyase" refers to the
general position of war chief, while "Iyase" refers to the particular war chief in
the year of the Benin Massacre.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 38.
15. Id.
16. ROBERT HOME, CITY OF BLOOD REVISITED: A NEW LOOK AT THE BENIN
EXPEDITION OF 1987 36 (1982).
17.

BEN-AMOS, supra note 6, at 53.

18. Id. at 54.
19. HOME, supra note 16, at 28.
20.

BEN-AMos, supra note 6, at 54.

21. Id. at 54, 57.
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First contact between Benin and Europe occurred in the
sixteenth century, when Portuguese explorers, who described the
city as being "as prosperous, civilized, and populous as towns and
cities in Portugal," 22 began to trade in West Africa. The
Portuguese explorers developed a symbiotic trade relationship with
the oba, moving the kingdom's trade interests to the coast, thereby
expanding prior inland-concentrated trade. 23
The Portuguese
traded cloth, glass, and weapons for pepper, beads, and ivory, and
offered military assistance to the oba against other kingdoms.24
Though these initial trade routes remained open for centuries
after the initial contact, the Portuguese left West Africa and were
replaced by different European trading companies. 25 By the late
nineteenth century, the British dominated the Niger coast.26 The
British were reluctant to accept the trading conditions as dictated
by the oba; they began to make plans to take control of the region,
which would in turn allow them to control all trade. 27 The plans of
the British were advanced by the Berlin Conference of 1884-85,
which declared that the geographical area around the kingdomthe coast between Cameroon and the Lagos colony-was within
the British "sphere of influence."28 The conference aimed to quell
mounting animosity among European nations over territorial
disputes in Africa, in what had come to be known as the "Scramble
for Africa." After the conference, the British set out to establish a
protectorate over the region, a colonial cost-saving measure that
placed "African territories under the protection of civilized
nations."29
Gradually, the British deposed the rulers of other kingdoms
around Benin City until Benin remained among the last few
strongholds.30 The British were instrumental in the defeat of
several leading chiefs and kings, including King Jaja of Opobo,
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

HOME, supra note 16, at 1.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Plakensteiner, supra note 4, at 25.
Id.
Id.
HOME, supra note 16, at 3.
Plakensteiner, supranote 4, at 25.
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and Nana of Itsekiri; like the Oba of Benin, both men were
perceived as great obstacles to trade." The Oba and his officials
perhaps began to see the writing on the wall, and suspected that it
was only a matter of time until the British came for them.32
The British first attempted to bring the kingdom under their
control through treaty. The first British vice counsel stationed in
the Benin area was Captain Henry Gallwey (later spelled
Galway)." Galway's name would become synonymous with the
treaty some commentators argue gave the British the right to take
over the kingdom and the antiquities therein.34 In 1892, Galway
went to the Oba to negotiate the terms of the treaty." Essentially,
the terms of the treaty greatly reduced the Oba's sovereignty. As
per the treaty, in return for the Queen of England's favor and
protection, "the Oba agreed to entertain no foreign power without
British approval, to give the consular officials full and exclusive
jurisdiction over British subjects in Benin and the right to arbitrate
in disputes, to act upon their advice, to allow free trade, and to
receive missionaries."" However, the Oba may not have fully
comprehended the implications of the treaty, perhaps in part
because in all his previous dealings with European traders and
representatives, none had attempted to usurp his power or
authority in this way."
B. The PunitiveExpedition
Despite Galway's treaty, trade did not improve because the Oba
did not open up the trade routes as the treaty required." By the
late nineteenth century, Galway was replaced by Ralph Moor,

31. Martins 0. Akanbiemu, The Dispersalof Benin Works of Art Vis-A-Vis
the Return and Restitution of Cultural Property - An Exceptional Case, 21
NEWSL. (MUSEUM ETHNOGRAPHERS GROUP) 95, 96 (Apr. 1987).
32. Id.
33. HOME, supra note 16, at 5.
34. Plakensteiner, supra note 4, at 25.
35. HOME, supra note 16, at 7.
36. Id. at 8. The treaty was signed by a chief on the Oba's behalf.
37. Id.
38. Id.
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whose deputy was James Phillips.39 As the trade situation
deteriorated, Moor began to plan ways to overthrow the Oba in
order to develop the protectorate.40 To implement these plans,
Moor enlisted the help of Phillips, who was eager to accomplish
the goal, as evidenced in Phillips' dispatch to the Foreign Office in
Britain, which read:
I therefore ask for His Lordship's permission to
visit Benin City in February next, to depose and
remove the King of Benin and to establish a native
council in his place and to take such further steps
for the opening up of the country as the occasion
may require. . . . - but in order to obviate any
danger [of attack] I wish to take up a sufficient
armed Force, consisting of 250 troops, two sevenpounder guns, I Maxim, and 1 Rocket
apparatus.... PS I would add that I have reason to
hope that sufficient Ivory may be found in the
King's house to pay the expenses in removing the
King from his Stool.4'
In response, the Foreign Office preached caution; therefore,
Phillips, on his own accord, planned an unarmed expedition to
Benin.4 2 Phillips' plan was a no-win situation for the Oba:
[Phillips] was using the last tactic short of armed
force ... visiting the Oba with a large party of
white men representing all British interests. . . .If
the Oba refused to see them, the affront to British
prestige would make it almost impossible for the
Foreign Office not to sanction an armed solution. If
he received them, he would be pressed to sign a
new and stricter treaty than Gallwey's, which
39. Id. at 30.
40. Id. at 32.
41. HOME, supra note 16, at 33-34 (quoting Phillips' letter to the dispatch
office).
42. Id. at 35.
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would open his country to British trade and political
control.43

Phillips was able to gather a party of about eight British officials
and about two hundred African porters from villages outside Benin
City." Phillips had hoped to attract a larger party, because he
expected that a larger group of white men would be less likely to
be attacked and would later help him justify the unsanctioned visit
to the colonial administrators in Britain.45
In Benin, news of Phillips' expedition was met with suspicion
and confusion.46 The Oba was not sure if the visit was truly a
peaceful one.47 In addition, the proposed visit was to be in
January, during the Ague festival.4 8 The Ague festival was a
sacred time in Benin, during which outside visitors were forbidden
to visit the city.49 Above all, the Oba was reluctant to fight the
British, declaring that since his birth, no white man had been killed
in Benin.5 ' As a leader, the Oba tried to avoid open conflict in his
political dealings, and was especially worried because of his
weakened position.5 ' The lyase was the strongest advocate for
war; at his insistence, the council of chiefs made the final decision
to attack Phillips' party, whether or not it included soldiers. 52 The
Oba rightly blamed the chiefs for encouraging the trouble, and
tried to postpone the coming clash by sending messengers to meet
Phillips' party and ask them not to come because of the festival."
When Phillips encountered the messengers from the Oba, he
ignored the Oba's message, and sent the messengers back.54

43. Id.
44. Id at 40.
45. Id
46. Id. at 35.
47. HOME, supra note 16, at 35.
48. Id. at 35-36.
49. Id at 36. The Ague festival was a time of thanksgiving and fasting that
was meant to help the people appreciate what they had. Id.
50. Id at 35.
51. Id. at 36.
52. Id.
53. ALAN BOISRAGON, THE BENIN MASSACRE 59 (2007).
54. HOME, supra note 16, at 41.
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Phillips then sent his own messengers to reiterate that he was still
coming as promised." Without waiting for a reply from the Oba,
Phillips pushed forth towards Benin. 6 As the party approached the
city, it was met by friendly chiefs from neighboring villages who
also warned against going to Benin." The party also encountered
other warnings along the way, such as empty villages, cleared out
in anticipation of the expected battle, and reports of Edo soldiers
being spotted in the area." Alan Boisragon, one of two surviving
British officials from Phillips' party, later reported that he had a
running wager with Phillips that the party would be stopped by a
Benin party before it reached Benin City." Boisragon added that,
had the British party been stopped, the British foreign office would
have perceived this as an insult, and would have responded by
sending an armed expedition to fight any such opposition.6 0
The Edo ambush was well laid; all but two of the British
officials in the party were killed.' The attack lasted about half an
hour, and killed a large number of the African carriers; some
escaping survivors were captured and later enslaved.62 The fleeing
carriers dropped the trunks they had been carrying, some of which
contained the British party's weapons.
Preparations for the retaliation were almost instantaneous.
When he received word of the massacre, Galway sent word to the
Oba demanding that he return prisoners and property
immediately.' The Oba replied that all hostages were dead, and
returned two rings." The Oba also declared defiantly that he
would not receive any more messages, and that he would instead

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 42.
BOISRAGON, supra note 53, at 63.
Id.
HOME, supra note 16, at 44.
Id. at 45.
Id. at 44.
Id. at 49.
Id.
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await the inevitable retaliation, prepared to fight to the last man in
his kingdom.66
When news of the attack reached Britain, it was readily apparent
that the government was going to dispatch a punitive expedition
for Benin.F The expedition was billed as just war, morally
justifiable both to avenge the massacre and to stop the human
sacrifices in the "city of blood."" The British public was supposed
to understand and support the moral necessity and duty to dethrone
a tyrannical, bloodthirsty, primitive Oba. A month after the
Phillips massacre, the British began a fierce attack on Benin City,
partly to punish the city for the massacre and partly to gain control
of trade in the area.69 Despite British expectations of a weak
resistance, they met a determined Edo defense armed with guns
and cannons from their trading days with the Portuguese.70
However, the British had superior weapons, and the Edo guns
were "antiquated and unreliable," and the cannons old and
unused.7 ' The British were unfamiliar with the warfare tactics of
the Edo, and the Edo soldiers had an advantage in the bush.72
However, the British countered this advantage by using maxims
and rocket guns to clear the bush, burning houses in villages as
they advanced on Benin."
Eventually, Benin City fell, with the Oba and a few of his
subjects escaping into the bush to avoid capture.74 After the
British took the city, they began to loot the palace for what they
called "spoils of war."7 In the palace, the British found a cache of
art treasures, largely comprised of brass castings and ivory

66. Id
67. HOME, supra note 16, at 102-03.
68. Id Benin City was often referred to as the "city of blood" because of
various European visitors' description of the extent of human sacrifice in the
city. Id
69. Id at 68
70. Id
71. Id
72. Id at 80
73. HOME, supra note 16, at 80.
74. Id at 88.
75. Id
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carvings."6 Most of the carvings were taken directly from altars,
which were covered with the remnants of various sacrifices." The
palace shrines also contained various bronze memorial heads, cast
after each Oba's death, and carved ivory tusks depicting each
Oba's achievements." The heads and tusks were taken away
without recording their relative positions or which Oba they
commemorated." Bronze plaques were found both in the main
palace and in a storage room "buried under the dust of
generations." 0 All of the material objects were assembled in a
courtyard where they were divided as official and unofficial booty,
and then shipped to Britain."' The unofficial booty was divided
among the British soldiers according to rank.82 For years, the
British thought that the treasures they had recovered were created
by the Portuguese, because "their artistic quality and advanced
technology were apparent to even the most prejudiced eye.""
About three days after the initial occupation of Benin City, a
great fire burned down the palace and the main city.84 Though
there were conflicting accounts of the cause of the fire, the official
British account was that it was started by two drunken carriers,
who were the only casualties of the fire." Six months after the
palace's destruction, the Oba returned to Benin City and
surrendered to the British forces at the new court house, in front of
his former palace, where he was informed that he would have to
stand trial for the Phillips massacre.86 Several chiefs had already
returned to the city; some faced trial and were executed, while
others were incorporated into the newly formed Council of
Chiefs."
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id.
Plakensteiner, supra note 4, at 32.
HOME, supra note 16, at 100.
Id.
Plakensteiner, supra note 4, at 32.
Id.
Id.
HOME, supra note 16, at 88.
Id. at 89.
Id.
Id. at 111.
Id.
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After the Oba's trial, it was determined that he had not played a
main role in the massacre; therefore, instead of receiving a death
sentence, the Oba was exiled to Calabar, Nigeria." In addition, the
British wished to ensure that the Oba's traditional role as leader
was extinguished. Moor made this clear in a speech in which he
declared that "Overami is no longer the king of this country; the
white man is the only man who is king in this country, and to him
only service is due."" The Oba's exile marked the end of the
monarchy in favor of rule by a council of chiefs.
The Oba died in captivity in 1914, and his eldest son pleaded
with the British to let him succeed the throne and become the new
Oba, replacing the Council of Chiefs as the native ruler of the Edo
people.90 The British agreed to his proposal, and he was crowned
Oba Eweka II." Though this reestablished the monarchy, the
power and rule of the Oba was now subject to British authority.
After Nigerian independence, the kingdom was subject to the
Nevertheless, the
authority of the Nigerian government.9 2
monarchy continues to exist to this day. The Nigerian government
and the Benin royal family have continuously requested the return
of the cultural property looted by the British. These requests have
largely fallen on deaf ears. To date, no major museums have
restituted any Benin artifacts.
II. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

A. Nineteenth Century InternationalLaw and the Spoils of War
British title to the Benin bronzes and ivories ostensibly rests on
nineteenth century international law on the spoils of war, as was
applied to non-European people. Another often-cited source of
authority for title to the bronzes is the Galway treaty. However,
the treaty between the Oba and Captain Galway did not concern or
affect property rights, and therefore cannot be the basis for the
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id. at 112.
HOME, supra note 16, at 112.
Id. at 122.
Id.
Id.
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British claiming title." An analysis of the validity of the title to
the bronzes, therefore, must begin with an analysis of nineteenth
century international law on wartime plunder and subsequent
restitution.
Restitution as a legal concept in western jurisprudence has its
roots in ancient Rome.94 References to restitution at that time
meant restitution in integrum, which generally referred to a

restoration of the status quo existing before certain events, such as
war, that were later found to be illegal." As international law
developed, this definition of restitution became shaped by the
practice or customs of the day.96 However, restitution was
developed from an absolute rule of ignoring any vanquished state's
property rights.97 The enemy's property was considered res nullis,
ownerless from the moment of the declaration of war, thereby
allowing the conqueror to claim it once they possessed it." This
concept of war booty, or prize, was eventually undermined by the
medieval concept of a "just war."99 Under the "just war" concept,
a belligerent army could only keep the property of a state they
fought in war if the war itself was just and necessary.'" Objects
obtained in unjust wars had to be returned, because the sin of
waging an unjust war could not be otherwise forgiven.ior
Purchasers of goods taken in this unjust manner could never
acquire clear title in those goods.'02 As Hugo Grotius put it, "if the
reason for the war is unjust, all activities resulting from this war
are unjust because of their intrinsic injustice."' 3 While the
concept of war and restitution was based on religious principles,

93. See generally Phillip A. Igbafe, The FallofBenin: A Reassessment, II J.
AFR. HiST. 385 (1970).
94. WOJCIECH W. KOWALSKI, ART TREASURES AND WAR 1 (1998).

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id. at 2-3.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 6.
Id.
Id.
KoWALSKI, supra note 94, at 6.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 7.
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internationally, the practice of restituting war booty or prizes was
based on restitution reciprocity between nations."*
By the seventeenth century, philosophers such as John Locke
began to question the grounds for the right of the victor to take the
Locke recognized the right of the victor to take
spoils of war.'
the enemy's life, without extending this right to take possession of
the enemy's property.'0 6 Locke explained his position with an
example;
For though I may kill a Thief that sets on me in the
Highway, yet may I not (which seems less) take
away his Money and let him go; this would be
Robbery on my side. His force, and the state of war
he put himself in, made him forfeit his Life, but
gave me no Title to his Goods.'
Eighteenth century scholars further acknowledged that the
private property of the king and his subjects was protected during
But, it was not until the
war, and also subject to restitution.'
nineteenth century that the principles of restitution were fully
developed. The development of these principles can be attributed
in large part to the large-scale plunder inflicted by Napoleon and
his armies in Europe and elsewhere during the Napoleonic wars.
European nations accused Napoleon's government of pillaging
contrary to "all principles of justice and customs of modern
war."' 09 After Napoleon's defeat, the allied powers required him to
return looted artworks that he had taken from European nations."'
However, Napoleon was not required to return any of the objects
looted from Egypt."'

104. Id
105. Id.
106. KOWALSKI, supra note 94, at 7.
107.

Id. at 8 (quoting JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES ON GOVERNMENT 309-

10 (1698)).
108. Id. at 21.
109. Id. at 23.
110. Id.
111. Id.
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Ironically, one of the reasons the allies pushed for restitution of
Napoleon's plunder was to further cement their own national
identity,'1 2 a concept largely shunned by cultural property
internationalists today. In the nineteenth century, there was a
rising national consciousness among European states, recognizing
that cultural goods belonging to the nation-state contributed to the
definition of its identity." 3 Thus, the basis for restitution became
the new principle of protecting the integrity of the national cultural
heritage." 4 Additionally, there was recognition that cultural and
artistic patrimony could not be separated from its nation of origin,
because it was a permanent link to the nation's past and a key to its
future creative expression."'
However, the restitution required of Napoleon was not a uniform
principle of return. Time limits were ignored to allow for justice
and an accurate consideration of national culture. For example,
the Heidelberg manuscripts looted two hundred years earlier were
returned to Germany."' The return of the Heidelberg manuscripts
also illustrated the allied powers' recognition of a principle of a
special territorial link between cultural objects and their country of
origin. The manuscripts were returned to Heidelberg, not to the
Vatican, from where Napoleon's armies had looted them."' As
with other restitution principles, this territorial principle was not
applied to African territories. After the First World War, for
example, in the Treaty of Versailles, the British required Germany
to transfer German East Africa to the British as its mandate

112. KOWALSKI supra note 94, at 23.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Teresa McGuire, African Antiquities Removed During Colonialism:
RestoringA Stolen CulturalLegacy, 1990 DET. C.L. REV. 31, 36 (1990).
116. KOWALSKI supra note 94, at 28. The Heidelberg manuscripts were a
collection of manuscripts in Heidelberg, Germany in the 14th century.
JEANNETTE GREENFIELD, THE RETURN OF CULTURAL TREASURES 210 (2007).
The manuscripts were taken from Heidelberg during the Thirty Years War, and
given to the Vatican in 1634. Id. Subsequently, Napoleon, through the imposed
1797 Treaty of Tolentino, transferred the manuscripts from the Vatican to Paris.
Id
117. KOWALSKI, supra note 94, at 28.
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territory."8 Additionally Germany was to transfer a cultural
remain, the skull of Sultan Makaoua, to Britain, and not to the East
African people from whom it had been taken."'
The restitution movement of the nineteenth century eventually
culminated in the codification of the restitution principles in the
Brussels Conference of 1874, the Hague Convention of 1899, and
the Hague Convention of 1907. However, these conventions only
codified or sanctioned the existing state of international law, and
did not create any new obligations of restitution.
The recognition of the nineteenth century international law
custom of ignoring legitimate sales and other such considerations
to ensure justice is especially important in analyzing the case for
the restitution of the Benin Bronzes today. This custom may also
be seen in the Belgian reversal of sales of the Van Eyck panels
from Germany after the First World War.'20 Belgium asked
Germany to restitute the panels, even though the Germans had
legally purchased some of them, arguing that the painting in its
complete form constituted part of Belgium's cultural heritage and
should not be separated. 2 ' In looking at the history of Benin
artistic creation, the division or separation of the bronzes and
ivories from Benin should be equally deplorable. As discussed
below, the only reason restitution customs in international law did
not apply to the Benin case was due to nineteenth century racism.
Applying the custom of considering justice first, race should not be
considered a factor in an analysis of the nineteenth century
international law on spoils.
B. HistoricalAttitudes Towards Non- Western Societies
The restitution exclusion for non-European states can be
attributed to marked efforts in the nineteenth century to exclude
colonized peoples from the protections afforded by international

118.
119.
120.
12 1.

Id. at 31.
Id.
McGuire, supra note 115, at 37-38.
Id.
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law. 2 2 International Law replaced the Law of Nations, under
which some Europeans argued for the inclusion and protection of
non-European people.123 As such, there was a move from a
separation of the world's population from "civilized" and
"differently civilized" peoples to "civilized" and "uncivilized"
peoples.124 As these changes were incorporated into international
law and the law became more favorable to European nations,
indigenous people became "objects of international law," and
could therefore not seek relief under it.'25 Therefore, in the
nineteenth century, customary international law was not generally
applicable to colonized peoples.
As expressed from a European point of view, "humanitarian
measures only covered warfare between civilized nations."l26
Several contemporary writers have acknowledged these
distinctions, and used them as the basis for a proposition that
former empires rightly have title to looted cultural objects.127 This
adherence to custom in international law is important in a judicial
forum interpreting past international law; as the Supreme Court of
the United States in a 1900 case stated,

122. ANA FILIPA VRDOLJAK, INTERNATIONAL LAW, MUSEUMS AND THE
RETURN OF CULTURAL OBJECTS 50 (2008).
123. Id. at 47. Spanish jurists Francisco de Vitoria and Bartolom6 de las
Casas advocated for the inclusion of indigenous peoples within the Law of
Nations. Id at 47-48. Though they did not necessarily consider these peoples
equals, and referred to them as "exotic anomalies", the theorists nevertheless
argued for their limited inclusion and protection. Id at 47.
124. Id. at 50.
125. Id. at 51. With the incorporation of indigenous groups into larger states,
indigenous people were only recognized as part of those states, and any
applications of international law bent to State sovereignty. Id. Essentially, this
meant that for a colonized people, the only rights they has were those given by
the colonizer.
126. Id. at 65.
127. See, e.g., Josh Shuart, Is All "Pharaoh"in Love and War? The British
Museum's Title to the Rosetta Stone and the Sphinx's Beard, 52 U. KAN. L.
REv. 667, 695 (2004) (concluding that title to the Rosetta stone was rightfully
acquired by the British because, "it is unequivocal that in 1799-1801 there was
no rule of international law protecting the cultural property of non-European
entities from the clutches of European imperialists.").
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International law is part of our law, and must be
ascertained and administered by the courts of
justice of appropriate jurisdiction as often as
questions of right depending upon it are duly
presented for their determination. For this purpose,
where there is no treaty and no controlling
executive or legislative act or judicial decision,
resort must be had to the customs and usages of

civilized nations. 128
However, the customs should perhaps be studied in the context
of other customs of the time, and should be applied together in the
interest of justice.
Such relevant customs are illustrated, as discussed above, by the
duty imposed on Napoleon at the end of the Napoleonic Wars.
These customs continued even after the Benin punitive expedition
when Germany was also required to return looted cultural property
after World War I. While this latter example may not be seen as
precedential to the Benin case, it is illustrative of how steeped
these customs were in international law as applied to the
Europeans. In addition, after World War II, this process was
continued, and integrated into the various treaties that came at the
end of the war. 129 However, these concessions may only have been
allowed because the Jewish people were Europeans, and the
western community was, therefore, quicker to respond to their
pleas for justice. After all, after independence was granted to most
African states, there were no European calls for the restitution of
colonial plunder. Therefore, in the interest of justice and righting
the wrong of excluding a group of people from the protection of
the law on the basis of racism, we should apply the international
law as it existed in the nineteenth century for Europeans to the
restitution of the Benin Bronzes, as was the case after the
Holocaust.

128. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
129. VRDOLJAK, supra note 122, at 138-40.
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C. TransitionalJustice
The demand for restitution by African states, especially from
former colonial masters, transcends a need for possession of
priceless material artifacts. It is often an attempt to reclaim a
cultural past erased by years of colonial domination and
subjugation. The request in some ways also seeks to establish a
stronger international presence for the former colonized state, a
presence hindered by post-colonial struggles to establish national
identity apart from colonial powers. Most importantly, restitution
allows former colonial victims to take control of their cultural
narrative.
A group's control of cultural patrimony is seen as evidence of
equality, and has become "a privileged right in today's world."l 30
In terms of transitional justice, 3 ' restitution is seen as a way for
societies to undertake responsibility for past wrongs, resume a
place in the international community, and sidestep collective
guilt. 3 2 Ideally here, the societies or nations that would be
resuming a place in the international community would be the
former colonial powers. The Benin royal family may base their
restitution claims on moral grounds. Although this does not have
the force of law, it is a better approach to negotiated justice.
While there have been attempts to regain control of the cultural
narrative through other ways, such as social commentary in art and
post-colonial literature,' the exhibition of the Benin bronzes and
ivories in western museums continues the imperial narrative by
suggesting that the African is not capable of appreciating the value
130. Id. at 17.
131. Transitional justice is the set of judicial and non-judicial measures
implemented by different countries to redress the legacies of massive human
rights abuses. See Int'l Ctr. for Transitional Justice, What is Transitional
Justice?,http://ictj.org/about/transitional-justice?gclid=CO6Kmu Dt2K8CFUr
WKgodcxAsCg (last visited Apr. 30, 2012). The measures sometimes include
reparations or restitution. Id.
132. See generally Thdrese O'Donnell, The Restitution of Holocaust Looted
Art and TransitionalJustice: The Perfect Storm or the Raft of the Medusa?, 22
EUR. J. INT'L L. 50 (2011).
133. See generally Michael Bowles, The King, The Brit, The Bronze, and
The Cartoon, 12 J. MUSEUM ETHNOGRAPHY 133 (2000).
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of the objects or of properly caring for them. The imperial
narrative interferes with the Benin cultural narrative and, on a
macro level, with the development of Nigeria's post-independence
narrative. This interference is best illustrated by the 1970 request
for the return of the Queen Idia mask, one of five ivory masks
looted as part of the 1897 punitive expedition. The organizers of
the 1977 African festival FESTAC,134 held in Nigeria, requested
the Queen Idia mask from the British Museum so that it could be
used as the symbol of the festival.'3 ' The British Museum refused
the request, initially requiring a bond, and later arguing that the
Eventually, the festival
mask was too fragile to travel.'
37
proceeded with a replica of the mask.1 This interaction illustrates
the frustrations experienced by the former victims. Despite
independence and the notions of post-independence cooperation
between colonizers and the colonized, the British still hold the
power and the final verdict on whether the Nigerians and other
Africans have access to their cultural past.
In Nazi-looted art cases, "restitution is a mechanism for
survivors and heirs to reinstate [their social] status," by controlling
their past through controlling the objects of their cultural past. 38
Above all, restitution for Nazi-looted art allows for the veneration
of a culture "which tyranny sought to make disappear."'
Restitution thus allows the victims to move from being history's
134. FESTAC is the acronym for the World Black and African Festival of
Arts and Culture, held in Lagos, Nigeria, in 1977. The festival was aimed at
promoting and celebrating African cultural traditions. Andrew Apter, FESTAC
for Black People: Oil Capitalism and the Spectacle of Culture in Nigeria, 6
PASSAGES1 (1993).

135. Kwame Opoku, Was the Decision to Cancel the Benin Mask Based on
Moral Principles, or Merely a Tactical Withdrawal?, ELGINISM,
http://www.elginism.com/20110127/3512/ (last visited Apr. 30, 2012).
136. Kwame Opoku, They Are Selling Queen-MotherIdia Mask and We Are
All Quiet, Modem Ghana, http://www.modernghana.com/news/309827/1/theyare-selling-queen-mother-idia-mask-and-we-are.html (last visited Mar. 17,
2013).
137.

Id.

138. Th6r~se O'Donnell, The Restitution of Holocaust Looted Art and
TransitionalJustice: The Perfect Storm or The Raft of The Medusa?, 22 EUR. J.
INT'L L. 49, 50 (2011).
139. Id. at 56.
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objects to its subjects. 40 The re-characterization of the victims
from objects to subjects is similarly needed for former colonial
states such as Nigeria. In addition to having their cultural
identities continuously vilified and diminished, colonized states
may feel more powerless because they emerged from colonial rule
with even their territorial borders pre-determined by the colonial
masters, often splitting traditionally cohesive groups of people into
different countries.14 ' While colonialism cannot be blamed for all
of Africa's current woes, it can be tied to loss of cultural
identity.'4 2 Independence and self-governance also brought more
cultural confusion, often with yearnings to simulate the colonial
standards of civilization at the expense of the African cultural
identity.'4 3 For the Kingdom of Benin, the request for restitution
may therefore be a way for the people to surmount a state of
cultural confusion by linking their post-colonial identity to a
documented, glorious past.
However, the recognition of the role of restitution as applied to
former colonial states may face more challenges because former
colonial states do not necessarily acknowledge the same
responsibility for past wrongs, have not been excluded from the
international community for their colonial actions, and, for the
most part, do not exhibit any collective colonial guilt.'44 Unlike
with the Holocaust, where there is an almost universal
condemnation of the wrong done by the Nazis, with colonialism,
there is greater acceptance of the imperial mission. Colonialism is
sometimes seen as a form of Social Darwinism, where the might of

140. Id.
141. A.I. Asiwaju, The ConceptualFramework, in PARTITIONED AFRICANS:
ETHNIC RELATIONS ACROSS AFRICA'S INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES, 18841984 1-18 (A.I. Asiwaju ed. 1985).
142. WANGARI MAATHAI, THE CHALLENGE FOR AFRICA 5 (2010).
143. See, e.g., Adelaide Casely-Hayford, Mista Courifer, in AN AFRICAN
TREASURY 164 (Langston Hughes ed., 1960).
144. See, e.g., Africa, le pauvre, KWANI?, www.kwani.org/editorial/report
essay/37/africa le pauvre.htm (last visited Apr. 30, 2012) (Nicolas Sarkozy's

2007 speech in Senegal, where he claimed that Africans should refrain from
dreaming of a golden age in their past, because such an age never existed).
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the imperial machine is respected. 14 5 It seems well recognized that
the superior European societies won over the inferior colonized
ones; despite the parallels that can be drawn between atrocious
colonial practices and the Holocaust.'46 The "White Man's
Burden," as colonialism was referred to, has been construed as a
"favor" to the colonized states. 4 7 For example, part of the
justification for the invasion of Benin was to help end the
"horrors" that were the traditional practices of the Edo people.'48
In this narrative, the British are seen as the saviors of the Benin
"victims," and the history and practices of the Edo people are
collectively vilified to justify colonial action. As the African
proverb goes, "until the lion learns to speak, the tale of the hunt
will glorify the hunter." Until the Benin people regain control of
the past, the information that accompanies the exhibited objects
and the characterization of their importance will always be
favorable to the imperial past.
D. Reasons For Refusal ofRestitution
The museums that hold the Benin cultural treasures and other
such colonial plunder often provide a litany of excuses for why
restitution is not advisable. Leading cultural property scholars
have divided the prevalent views on restitution into two main
camps: cultural internationalists and cultural nationalists. Though
these divisions are usually applied in the context of a market
argument for or against a licit market in antiquities, they are
equally applicable in the context of a debate on the restitution of
colonial plunder.

145. Mirgen Zimmerer, Colonialism and the Holocaust - Towards an
Archeology of Genocide, 50 DEv. DIALOGUE, 95, 101 (2008).
146. Id. at 100.
147. Barkan, supra note 1, at 20; see also supra text accompanying note
138.
148. See Bowles, supra note 133, at 136.
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1. CulturalNationalism v. CulturalInternationalism
Cultural nationalism is based on the premise that cultural
property belongs at the place or among the descendants of the
culture of its origin.14 9 According to the leading scholar in the
area, John Henry Merryman, cultural nationalism has a tendency to
become invidious, to breed rivalry, misunderstanding and conflict,
and to divide rather than unite.' Despite these views, Merryman
finds a role for cultural nationalism in defining culture, conceding
that a people deprived of its cultural property is culturally
impoverished."' Cultural nationalism is most favored by countries
with rich cultural heritage. These countries often pass laws
intended to protect their cultural heritage from looting and the
illicit trade in antiquities; as a result, these countries are often
criticized as being retentionist or selfish and prohibiting or limiting
access to the general international community.'52 This criticism is
not a very accurate characterization. In the Benin case, for
example, the request for restitution has been for some, and not all,
of the looted objects.'53
Cultural internationalism, conversely, is defined as "the idea that
everyone has an interest in the preservation and enjoyment of
cultural property wherever it is situated, from whatever cultural or
geographic source it derives."'

Cultural internationalism is

thought to be object-oriented, resting on the principles of
preservation, truth, and access.' In contrast, cultural nationalism
focuses on nation-oriented principles of nationalism, legality, and
morality.'56 The internationalism debate is further coupled with an
argument that the cultural objects are better protected and
149. JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, LAW, ETHICS, AND THE VISUAL ARTS 342
(2007).
150. Id. at 343.
151. Id.
152. E.K. Agorsah, Restitution of Cultural Material to Africa, 12 AFR.
SPECTRUM, 305 (1977).
153. Id.
154. IMPERIALISM, ART AND RESTITUTION 12 (John Henry Merryman ed.,
2010).
155. Id. at 12 n.30.
156. Id
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preserved in western museums, some of which have branded
themselves "universal" or encyclopedic museums.
Merryman, in advocating for cultural internationalism, points to
the famous Marquis de Somerueles case as an example of early
In the
judicial recognition of the internationalism concept.
Marquis de Somerueles, the court was faced with the question of
whether a captured ship's cargo should be restituted to a scientific
institution in Philadelphia.'" Merryman quotes the court's opinion
that the arts and sciences "are considered not as the [property] of
this or that nation, but as the property of mankind at large, and as
belonging to the common interests of the whole species.""'
However, even with this supposed recognition of the universal
nature of the arts, the court nevertheless ordered the works
released to the scientific institution in Philadelphia.'" The court's
decision in the Marquis de Somerueles seems to question the
notion that just because art or cultural property may be considered
universal, it should be kept by the looter. Should an aggressor be
allowed to take a cultural object away his victim and then later
claim that its universal nature allows him to keep it? Furthermore,
what would an international approach to cultural heritage be?
Would the Benin bronzes and ivories be any less universal, from
an internationalist's view, if they were returned to Benin City and
viewed there, in their original home?
Nevertheless, some universal museum directors argue that
universal museums in the West are better equipped to handle the
responsibility of being the stewards of the international cultural
property. For example, Neil MacGregor, the director of the British
Museum, expresses this stewardship as being ingrained in the
British Museum's charter as a universal museum.' In addition,
he claims that as we all have African ancestors, the location of the
objects outside of Africa does not matter, as long as they are in a
157. PATTY GERSTENBLITH, ART, CULTURAL HERITAGE AND THE LAW 526
(2d ed., 2008).
158. Id. at 598 (quoting The Marquis de Somerueles, 1 Stew. V.A. 482
(Vice-Adm. Ct. N.S. 1813)).
159. Id. at 527.
160. Neil MacGregor, To Shape The Citizens of "That Great City, The
World, " in WHOSE CULTURE?: THE PROMISE OF MUSEUMS AND THE DEBATE
OVER ANTIQUITIES 43 (James Cuno ed., 2009).

https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol23/iss2/5

24

Kiwara-Wilson: Restituting Colonial Plunder: The Case for the Benin Bronzes and

BENIN BRONZES

2013]

399

universal museum. 6 ' In the same article, MacGregor describes the
impetus for the punitive expedition as "[t]he king of Benin [taking]
the British legation hostage." 6 2 MacGregor further explains that
after the sacking of the city, the British took the bronzes and
ivories from the Oba and sold them for the benefit of the
hostages,'
illustrating the argument that he who controls the
objects controls the story. MacGregor's story here manages to
soften the British role in the massacre and expedition; he makes it
seem justifiable that the British deprived the Oba and his people of
their cultural heritage in order to afford the British "hostages" of
the Phillips Massacre some measure of restitution for what they
must have gone through.
In one paragraph, MacGregor manages to obfuscate the history
of a people and the importance of their cultural heritage. He cites
instead the importance the objects had later in European history by
describing how the bronzes eventually changed European
stereotypes of Africa.'" However, even acknowledging that the
Benin bronzes played this large of a role in changing European
stereotypes in the past, would it not be time now to return them to
a post-colonial Nigeria? There, they could be used to build up an
African country that spent years under colonial rule being
convinced of their inferiority to the Europeans. Nigerians could
witness and study the magnificent artistic productions of their
ancestors and, in this way, the bronzes would play the same
admirable role MacGregor credits them with, but in a
contemporary setting.
In concluding his article, MacGregor asserts that the British
Museum has been willing to make loans of African artifacts to
other countries, pointing to loans made to museums in San
Francisco and Kenya.'
However, he doesn't provide any
examples of extensive loans to other African countries or loans of
non-African art to African countries. Before he discusses the loan
to the National Museums of Kenya, MacGregor offers two
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id at 44.
Id. at 51.
Id.
Id.
Id at 44, 53-54.
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examples, discussed below, of the role of the universal museums
in facilitating dialogue.'66 Both examples seem geared to remind
the reader of the violence that exists in Africa, as though to suggest
that is the reason an encyclopedic museum cannot be situated in
somewhat dangerous Africa.
MacGregor cites the Kenyan exhibition as successful because it
allowed the Kenyan people to consider the world from different
perspectives, thus fulfilling the role of the universal museum.' 7 In
citing this example, MacGregor does not mention the fact that the
exhibition actually reignited the restitution controversy, prompting
some Kenyans to question why the artifacts had to be kept in
storage in Britain, as opposed to on display in Kenya and other
African countries.' 8 Others simply questioned the morality of the
loan process, considering the circumstances under which the
objects were acquired by the British; one museum-goer asked
"[h]ow can you loan something back to the person you stole it
from, then expect him to give it back again?"' 69
The location of the objects is also important due to access.
Internationalists argue that more people have access to the objects
if they are located in Western museums.
In this way,
internationalism is key to the idea of the universal museum. While
the access argument may be true for a large number of
international tourists, it is hardly true for many in Nigeria. For
them, travel abroad is largely unaffordable, with high immigration
fees and other requirements to visit the United States or the United
Kingdom. Internet access does not help either because many
Nigerians may not have as much access to the internet and online
databases of universal museums as may people in the West. The
physical location of the objects in Nigeria, with an online database
available to the international community, may therefore provide
more access to more people both locally and internationally.

166. MacGregor, supra note 160, at 54.
167. Id.
168. Mike Pflanz, Are Stolen Treasures Really Better Off in the West?,
ELGINISM, http://www.elginism .com/20060413/400/ (last visited Apr. 30,
2012).
169. Id.
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In 2002, several major museums around the world, including the
Art Institute of Chicago and the Metropolitan Museum of Art, both
holders of Benin bronzes, signed the Declaration on the
Importance and Value of the Universal Museums.o In relevant
part, the declaration stated that:
Calls to repatriate objects that have belonged to
museum collections for many years have become an
important issue for museums. Although each case
has to be judged individually, we should
acknowledge that museums serve not just the
citizens of one nation but the people of every
nation. Museums are agents in the development of
culture, whose mission is to foster knowledge by a
continuous process of reinterpretation. Each object
contributes to that process. To narrow the focus of
museums whose collections are diverse and
multifaceted would therefore be a disservice to all
visitors."
In advocating for the internationalism of cultural property, the
museum signatories to the declaration try to avoid their eventual
extinction if there was a change in status quo. Therefore, they
argue that humanity is better when museums are not narrowly
focused, because people benefit from an intimate understanding of
the world and their place in it.'72 Paradoxically, this is the same
reason restitution to former colonized states is crucial. Former
colonized peoples could similarly understand their place in the
world by understanding and controlling their past.
Advocates for internationalism sometimes craft descriptions of
the two opposing views in terms like "good" and "bad," saying
that "[t]o preserve the cultural and artistic diversity of humankind

170.

See generally,

IMPORTANCE

AND

INT'L COUNCIL MUSEUMS, DECLARATION ON THE
VALUE
OF
UNIVERSAL
MUSEUMS,
available at

http://icom.museum/fileadinin/user-upload/pdf/ICOMNews/20041/ENG/p4_2004-1.pdf (last visited Apr. 30, 2012).
17 1. Id.
172. MacGregor, supra note 160, at 40.
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is good, and to reduce it by the elimination of a species of cultural
and artistic manufacture through negligence or choice is bad."173
In this context, the universal museum is then seen as doing the
"right thing." The former director of the Art Institute, James
Cuno, goes even further by declaring that terms such as "cultural
property" are a political contrast, which he considers negative
because it allows one political entity to claim its cultural property
Curo's position is
as important to the entity's identity.174
somewhat ironic because the universal museum, as described in
the declaration of the universal museum, is itself a political
construct that allows western museums to claim the importance of
their identity through "universal cultural property."
Cuno further argues in favor of the universal museum by
arguing that the clash of civilizations that nationalism implies is
"manufactured."'
Cuno argues that by supporting universal or
encyclopedic museums, we concentrate on what unites us as a
universal people, as opposed to what divides us.'76 However, this
ignores the very obvious fact that all universal museums are found
in the West, or at least that no universal museums are found in
Africa. The African museums do not have access to the various
artifacts that would make them "universal," and so they are
deemed inferior to the western museums; this cements the cultural
division and reminds the former colony of its separation from the
western civilization that colonized it, a division that is hardly
"manufactured."
III. LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS
Although the Benin royal family may have a strong ethical case
for restitution, the legal case is somewhat weaker. As discussed
below, the legal case for restitution has been weakened by the
passage of time and the lack of legal action by the kingdom in
American courts.
James Cuno, View From The Universal Museum, in
15-16 (John Henry Merryman ed., 2010).
174. Id. at 17-18.
175. Id. at 19.
176. Id. at 19-20.
173.

IMPERIALISM, ART

AND RESTITUTION
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A. The Question of Title: American Institutions'Acquisition of
Benin Looted Artifacts
Following the approach taken in Nazi-looted art restitution
cases, any litigation geared towards the restitution of the Benin
bronzes and ivories is likely to begin with the question of title. It
is likely that most collections of Benin bronzes and ivories outside
of Nigeria draw their title from the British punitive expedition.
Based on the premise that the nineteenth century international law
should be applicable here, the taking of spoils of war from the
Oba's palace was contrary to the customs of international law.
Therefore, to determine the current title held by the American
museums, we must look to nineteenth century English law to
determine if title was acquired through other means and
subsequently transferred in sales to other parties. As discussed
below, applying English law, title to the Benin cultural property
likely passed in the nineteenth century when the objects were sold
at open auction.
1. English Law and the "nemo dat" Rule

Under the English Sales of Goods Act of 1893, a seller could
only transfer title to goods if he was the owner of those goods, or
was acting under the authority of the true owner in the sale. This
is known as the nemo dat rule."' The key exception to this rule
was the "market overt""' exception, which stated that "[w]here
goods are sold in market overt, according to the usage of the
market the buyer acquires good title of the goods, provided he
buys them in good faith and without any notice of any defect or
want of title on the part of the seller.""' The nemo dat rule is

177. The nemo dat quod non habet rule holds that, in general, no one can
sell personal property and convey a valid title to it unless he is the owner or
lawfully represents the owner. Mitchell v. Hawley, 83 U.S. 544, 550 (1872).
178. Market overt is an open market: a public market or fair legally held by
grant from the Crown or by prescription, or probably by authority of parliament.
See J. G. Pease, The Change of The Property In Goods By Sale In Market Overt,
8 COLUM. L. REV. 375 (1908).

179. Id.
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codified in the United States in the Uniform Commercial Code
Article 2 § 2-403.
The market overt exception was supposed to confer a duty on
the true owner to act reasonably in searching for his goods and
claiming them in the open market. However, this duty seems to
presuppose the owner's ability to act. The market overt exception
also indicated the good faith of the purchaser. In the case of the
Benin bronzes and the Kingdom of Benin, the true owners did not
have the ability to oppose a public sale of their artifacts because
they were under colonial rule, with little authority or legal recourse
to object to the sales. If colonial occupation is considered a
continuous act of war against the Benin people, then they were not
in a position to oppose the British sales of their cultural artifacts.
Additionally, it was impossible for the Benin royal family to
contest later sales in courts in Nigeria because "municipal courts
of the colonised countries were precluded from enquiring into
Without the authority to question the
sovereign behavior."'s
punitive expedition and determine its legality, a court in colonial
Nigeria could hardly have adjudicated fairly in a dispute over title.
Perhaps any such suit brought in colonized Nigeria, or in Britain,
would have been tolled until after Nigerian independence.
For the market overt exception to apply, the buyer must be a
good faith purchaser. To qualify as a good faith purchaser under
the Sales of Goods Act, the purchaser must not have notice of the
possible defect in the title of the good.' The circumstances of the
expedition were well known in the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries when the objects were auctioned, so it is likely that the
purchasers of the pieces were at least on notice that title could be
contested down the line. These purchasers then donated the works
to American museums, passing whatever title was acquired in the
earlier purchase. In this way, the donors and the museums may
not be considered good faith purchasers in the traditional sense of
the term.
In the case of Nazi-stolen artworks, given the socio-political
climate of the time, purchasers may reasonably have expected that
their title would never be questioned by "weaker" previous
180. VRDOLJAK, supra note 122, at 51.
181. Pease, supra note 178, at 375.
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owners. It could be argued that Nazi officials and other purchasers
of Nazi-looted art might reasonably have expected to keep their
loot. The Jewish people might have been seen as being in no
position to protest or contest title at that time, considering that
most of them were either fleeing Europe or were detained in Nazi
camps. Similarly, it would seem contrary to equity and justice to
allow purchasers of Benin cultural property to claim that they were
good faith purchasers because they could never have foreseen
Nigerian independence, or the subsequent demands for restitution.
Good faith purchase is irrelevant in a case for replevin in
American courts. Even a good faith purchaser does not acquire
title to stolen property. Nevertheless, an American court may
conduct a choice of law analysis to determine if European laws
should apply to the bronzes, since most of them were likely bought
in Europe.'82 Under European law, if the purchasers of the Benin
artifacts were not good faith purchasers because they had notice of
a defect in title, then they never acquired valid title from the
British looters who never had title to begin with.
B. Restitution of the Benin Bronzes and Ivories Located in the
UnitedStates
During World War II, Jewish families and individuals lost their
lives as well as their possessions, including numerous artworks, as
part of the Nazi aryanization programs. The extensive looting that
occurred during that time was thoroughly documented by the
Nazis, and was part of a plan to strip the Jewish people of their
personhood and cultural identity.'
After the war, the allies
required Germany to restitute various stolen artworks to the
countries they had invaded.184 While these concerted efforts were
somewhat effective, it was not until the 1990s that the Holocaustlooted art restitution movement picked up speed, with plaintiffs

182. See, e.g., Bakalar v. Vavra, 819 F. Supp. 2d 293, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
183. See generally, LYNN NICHOLAS, THE RAPE OF EUROPA: THE FATE OF
EUROPE'S TREASURES IN THE THIRD REICH AND THE SECOND WORLD WAR

(1995).
184.

VRDOLJAK, supra note 122, at 140-43.
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suing in American courts.'
Many of the cases were eventually
resolved through negotiated settlements. However, some cases, as
shown below, were litigated and established precedent for the
restitution of Nazi-looted art.
At the core of these restitution cases was a concern for
transitional justice, but there was also a concern for property
rights. Similarly in the case of the Benin bronzes, if the royal
family chose to sue in American courts, the basis of any claim
would be largely based on traditional property rights. Following
the nemo dat rule outlined above, the royal family may challenge
the title to the bronzes held by American museums in actions for
replevin.
Unfortunately, these challenges would likely be
unsuccessful due to the passage of time.
1. Legal Standing and Timeliness
During the 1997 Benin Centenary celebrations, in response to
calls seeking redress against the British from the International
Court of Justice, the Oba reiterated that only the Nigerian Federal
government could submit a plea to the court.'" While this could
be taken as a statement that the royal family has passed on any
claims they may have to the Nigerian government, it is more
probable that this was simply recognition that, in an arena such as
the International Court of Justice, only sovereign states may bring
forth claims. Nigeria may have standing if American courts
recognize the country as representing the royal family or the Benin
people. However, the royal family would most likely have
standing in American domestic courts. Even if the Oba owned
these works as trustee for the Benin people, the royal family would
still be the right party to bring action against any American
institutions with collections of Benin cultural property.
This leads to the question of when the royal family could have
legally brought their claim for restitution against American
museums. Arguably, the earliest time that this could have
occurred was following Nigeria's independence in 1960.
185. GERSTENBLITH,supra note 157, at 546-47.
186. See generally, Joseph Nevadomsky, The Great Benin Centenary, 30
AFR. ARTS 3 (1997).
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However, instead of seeking judicial intervention in the United
States, the Nigerian government and the Benin royal family have
made various attempts on the international stage to make
restitution claims, mainly against Britain.'17 These requests have
been consistent since at least the 1970s and have yielded almost no
returns.'" Unfortunately, the apparent delay in seeking judicial
redress in the United States would likely allow the American
museums to claim a statute of limitations defense. Other defenses
are available to the museums, but the statute of limitations may be
their strongest. While the statute of limitations may be waived in
certain cases following rules outlined below, the royal family may
face an uphill battle in trying to explain why they waited fifty
years to seek judicial intervention.
2. Demand and Refusal Rule v. Discovery Rule
Generally, claims for the return of stolen personal property may
be brought as suits for conversion or replevin. In order to succeed
in these types of claims, the plaintiff must show that she has title to
the property in question and should therefore be awarded
possession.'" Both actions are often governed by various statutes
of limitations, barring claims brought after the applicable time has
passed. The time limit is judged from the accrual of the cause of
action, although most statutes do not define accrual, and it is
therefore, up to the courts to interpret this term. The statute of
limitations may nevertheless be tolled in certain cases, following
different doctrines depending on jurisdiction. There are two main
rules applicable in tolling the statute of limitations in replevin
actions for the recovery of art and cultural property in American
courts: the demand and refusal rule and the discovery rule. The
187. Such appeals led to the Restitution of Works of Art to Countries
Victims of Expropriation, G.A. Res. 3187 (XXVIII), (Dec. 18, 1973).
188. The Nigerian Government has been able to buy some of the bronzes
along the way. This may be considered indication of recognition of the absence
of a cause of action. See, e.g., In re Peters, 821 N.Y.S. 2d 61 (2006). However,
it should be noted that the purchases were made by the Nigerian government, so
this should not affect the royal family's claim unless the government was acting
as an agent, or a successor in rights.
189. See, e.g., Carroll v. Curry, 912 N.E.2d 272 (111. App. Ct. 2009).
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demand and refusal rule is followed by a minority of courts, and is
applicable mainly in New York; it would apply if the royal family
brought suit against the Metropolitan Museum of Art.
The majority rule is the discovery rule. Should the royal family
seek to sue the Art Institute of Chicago and the Field Museum, this
is the rule that would most likely be applicable in Illinois. Though
Illinois law recognizes a demand and refusal rule, demand and
refusal are not substantive elements as they are under New York
law. Illinois courts do not require a demand before bringing suit in
a replevin action where the circumstances indicate its futility.'" In
addition, Illinois courts tend to favor the discovery rule in tort
actions "where the passage of time does little to increase the
problems of proof." 9 '
This language seems to favor the
application of the discovery rule in the Benin case. The passage of
time has done little to increase the problems of proof here; original
ownership of the bronzes and ivories can hardly be contested, and
the actions of the British in the punitive expedition are welldocumented historical facts. Since Benin ownership and British
acquisition would likely be the crucial facts in a case for replevin,
it is likely an Illinois court would apply the majority discovery
rule. However, a replevin action for the return of artworks taken
from the original owner in circumstances such as these would be a
case of first impression in Illinois. It is therefore speculative as to
which rule would apply.
a. Demandand Refusal Rule

According to the demand and refusal rule, the statute of
limitations does not begin to run until the wronged owner makes a
specific demand for the property and the current possessor refuses
to return the property.'92 The demand and refusal are substantive
elements of the action; there must be a demand for the return of the
property and a subsequent refusal by the possessor in order for the
190. Id. at 276. When the facts of a case indicate that any demand would be
ineffective because the party on whom the demand is made claims title, then
demand would be futile. See Id.
191. Nolan v. Johns-Manville Asbestos, 421 N.E.2d 864, 867 (111. 1981).
192. GERSTENBLITH, supra note 157, at 433.
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cause of action to accrue.'93 Under New York law, the statute of
limitations for actions in replevin or conversion is three years from
the accrual of the cause of action.'9 4 The statute of limitations
begins to run against the thief or bad faith purchaser on the date of
the theft or on the date of the bad faith purchase, even when the
owner is not aware of the theft.'95
The demand and refusal rule was first applied in the context of
an art case by the New York Court of Appeals in Menzel v. List."'
The plaintiff in Menzel sought to recover a painting, which she left
in their apartment in Brussels when she fled the invading Nazis in
March of 1941.197 Since the Nazis considered the painting in
question "decadent Jewish art," they seized it on or about March
31, 1941, and left a certification or receipt indicating that the
painting, among other works of art, had been taken into
safekeeping.' 98 Menzel escaped to the United States where she
resettled.19
Menzel searched for the painting once the war ended, but it was
not until 1962 that she discovered it was in the possession of the
defendant Albert List.200 Menzel demanded the return of the
painting, and List refused to comply. 20' Menzel then filed suit in a
replevin action to recover the painting.20 2 List raised numerous
defenses, including the statute of limitations, the act of state
doctrine, and abandonment.20 3 The court dismissed List's claims
that the painting was either abandoned by Menzel or taken
rightfully by the Germans. 204 The court characterized the seizure
of the painting as pillage or plunder, and since the painting was

193. Menzel v. List, 246 N.E.2d 742 (N.Y. 1969).
194. N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 214(3) (McKinney 2012).
195. See Grosz v. Museum of Modem Art, 772 F. Supp. 2d 473, 481-82
(S.D.N.Y. 2010).
196. Menzel, 246 N.E.2d at 742.
197. Menzel v. List, 267 N.Y.S.2d 804, 806 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966).
198. Id.
199. Id. at 807.
200. Id.
201. Menzel, 267 N.Y.S.2d at 807.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 809.
204. Id. at 810.
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private property, this was against international law.205 The court
then reiterated the demand and refusal rule, stating that "[i]n
replevin, as well as in conversion, the cause of action against a
person who lawfully comes by a chattel arises, not upon the
stealing or the taking, but upon the defendant's refusal to convey
the chattel upon demand."20 6 The rule in Menzel, allowing the
statute of limitations to run at the moment of theft when the
possessor knew of the theft, seemed to favor the thief, not the good
faith purchaser, and has been criticized for its apparent
unfairness.2 07
However, the Second Circuit dispelled that perception in
Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar v. Elicofon. In Elicofon, the court
recognized that, under equitable estoppel, the bad faith purchaser
would not be allowed to claim the protection of the statute of
limitations anyway.20 8 The Elicofon litigation was initiated to
recover two stolen Albert Dtirer paintings.209 The paintings
disappeared from Germany during the occupation of Germany by
the Allied Forces in 1945.210 In 1966, the paintings were
discovered in the possession of Edward Elicofon, who had
purchased them in New York from an American serviceman in
1946.211 The successor in interest to the original German museum
where the paintings were housed, the Kunstsammlungen zu
Weimar, sought to recover the paintings from Elicofon.2 12
The appellate court affirmed a grant of summary judgment in
favor of the Kuntsammulungen zu Weimar, rejecting Elicofon's
claim that the statute of limitations on the claim began to run in
1946, when he bought the paintings.2 13 Elicofon insisted that a rule
where the statute of limitations ran from demand upon a bona fide
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. See Bert Demarsin, Has the Time (of Laches) Come? Recent Nazi-Era
Art Litigation in the New York Forum, 59 BuFF. L. REv. 621, 640 (2011).
208. Kunstsammlungen Zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 678 F.2d 1150, 1163 (2d
Cir. 1982).
209. Id. at 1152-53.
210. Id. at 1155-56.
211. Id. at 1156.
212. Id.
213. Id at 1165-66.
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purchaser would indefinitely postpone commencement of the
action, while allowing the thief to have long since gained
immunity from suit.214 The appellate court disagreed with this
assertion, finding that the thief who concealed his possession,
thereby making it impossible for the owner to bring suit within the
limitations period, would likely be estopped from asserting the
statute of limitations as a defense.2 15 Secondly, the appellate court
affirmed the district court's holding that any delay in making a
demand was reasonable. 216 The district court stated that a demand
could not be indefinitely postponed, and had to be made within a
reasonable time. 217 The district court also indicated that the
question of what constituted a reasonable time to make a demand
depended upon the circumstances of the case. 218 Elicofon had
urged the district court to interpret the requirement of
reasonableness as bestowing a duty on the original owner to
diligently search for the property. 219 However, the court did not
decide the issue of a diligence requirement because it found that
the Kunstsammulungen zu Weimar had been diligent in its efforts
to recover the paintings.220
Elicofon's suggestion would later be applied in DeWeerth v.
Baldinger, where the court held that under New York law, an
original owner was indeed required to have diligently searched for
her stolen property.22'
In DeWeerth, the plaintiff s father
purchased a Monet painting in or about 1908.222 DeWeerth
inherited the painting after her father's death in 1922.223 In August

214. Elicofon, 678 F.2d at 1163.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 1165.
217. Kunstsammlungen Zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 536 F. Supp. 829, 849
(E.D.N.Y. 1981).
218. Id.
219. Id.
220.
Id. at 849-50.
The case details several actions that the
Kunstsammulungen took that evidence this diligence, especially the extensive
documentation of the theft by Dr. Scheidig who was the Deputy Director of the
Kunstsammlungen from 1940 to 1967. Id. at 833.
221. DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 836 F.2d 103, 108 (2d Cir. 1987).
222. Id. at 104.
223. Id.
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1943, during World War II, DeWeerth sent the painting to her
sister in Southern Germany for safekeeping.224 In the fall of 1945,
DeWeerth's sister informed her that the Monet had disappeared. 225
DeWeerth made various unsuccessful efforts to locate the
painting.226 In or soon after July 1981, DeWeerth, discovered that
the painting had been exhibited in 1970 in New York.227 She
thereafter learned that the defendant, Baldinger, possessed the
Monet. 2 28 By letter to Baldinger in 1982, DeWeerth demanded
return of the Monet. 229 Baldinger refused the demand the
following year, and DeWeerth brought an action to recover the
painting. 230 Baldinger argued that the action should have been
barred by laches and the statute of limitations due to DeWeerth's
long delay in asserting her claim, and also because she had not
diligently sought to discover the painting's whereabouts until
1983.231 The trial court held in favor of DeWeerth, dismissing
Baldinger's defenses and counterclaim with prejudice, and
ordering Baldinger to deliver the painting to DeWeerth.232
On appeal to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, the issue was
"whether New York law, which govern[ed] th[e] dispute,
require[d] an individual claiming ownership of stolen personal
property to use due diligence in trying to locate the property in
order to postpone the running of the statute of limitations in a suit
against a good-faith purchaser." 233 The Second Circuit decided
that New York courts would indeed impose a duty of reasonable
diligence on attempts to locate stolen property. 234 The court then
224. Id. at 105.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. DeWeerth, 836 F.2d 103 at 105.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 106.
231. Id. at 107.
232. DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 658 F. Supp. 688, 698 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
233. DeWeerth, 836 F.2d at 104.
234. Id. at 108. The Second Circuit chose not to certify the question of the
duty of due diligence to the New York Court of Appeals for a determination, as
this was a question of state law. Id. The court estimated "what the state's
highest court would rule to be its law." Id. Here it turns out the court estimated
incorrectly.
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analyzed DeWeerth's actions in the search for her paintings,
comparing her search to that undertaken in Elicofon, and held that
DeWeerth was not diligent in her search.235 The court thus
reversed the district court's judgment in favor of DeWeerth.236
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals' interpretation of New
York law's duty of due diligence was rejected in Solomon R.
Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell.237 DeWeerth is no longer good law
on this point. Lubell was a replevin action brought to recover a
gouache2 38 by Marc Chagall.239 The Guggenheim claimed that the
gouache was stolen in the mid-1960s by an unknown person.240
The Guggenheim learned of Lubell's possession of the gouache in
August 1985.241 On January 9, 1986 Guggenheim made a demand
on Lubell to return the gouache, and Lubell refused.242
Lubell stated that she and her husband purchased the gouache in
May 1967 without knowledge of any defects in the gallery's
title.24 3 She raised the statute of limitations, laches, adverse
possession, and her status as a good faith purchaser for value as
affirmative defenses.244 Lubell filed a motion for summary
judgment with the Supreme Court of New York based on the
statute of limitations.2 45 The motion was granted on the ground
that the Guggenheim's efforts to locate the gouache were not
235. Id. at Ill. The court determined that DeWeerth was not diligent
because she did not publicize her loss of the painting in any one of several
available listings designed to keep museums, galleries, and collectors vigilant
for stolen art. Id. The court further stated that "[m]ost indicative of DeWeerth's
lack of diligence [was] her failure to conduct any search for 24 years ...
Significantly, if DeWeerth had undertaken even the most minimal investigation
during this period, she would very likely have discovered the [painting], since
there were several published references to it in the art world." Id.
236. Id. at 112.
237. Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 550 N.Y.S.2d 618, 619-20
(N.Y. App. Div. 1990).
238. A gouache is a type of painting created using opaque watercolors.
239. Lubell, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 619.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.

244. Id.
245. Lubell, 550 N.Y.S.2d 618 at 619.
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reasonably diligent.246 On appeal, the appellate division of the
Supreme Court of New York held that whether or not the
Guggenheim was obligated to do more than it did in searching for
the gouache depended on the reasonableness of inaction; the court
determined that was a question of fact relevant to the defense of
laches, not the statute of limitations.24 7 The appellate division thus
held that Lubell's motion should not have been granted, and
dismissed the defense of statute of limitations.2 48 The decision was
affirmed on appeal to the Court of Appeals of New York.2 49 The
state courts thus wholly repudiated the DeWeerth court's
conclusion that New York law imposed a duty of due diligence on
the original owner.
In New York, the law on a replevin claim remains the same as
the court announced in Menzel. In addition, under Menzel and
Lubell, the burden of proving that property was not stolen, if the
current possessor contests theft, lies with the current possessor.
Questions of the owner's due diligence and reasonableness in
making the demand have also been deemed to be relevant to a
laches defense, and not to the demand and refusal rule.2 50 In
addition, it is likely that the demand for return must be made to the
specific possessor, and presumably in a direct manner. This
requirement seems to follow the reasoning behind the demand
rule: the demand gives notice to the possessor who, before a
demand, had done nothing wrong; it is the refusal that turns the
current possessor into a tortfeasor. However, the refusal does not
have to be specific. New York courts have held that the refusal
"need not use the specific word 'refuse' so long as it clearly
conveys an intent to interfere with the demander's possession or

246. Id. This was, perhaps, because the museum did not report the theft of
the gouache.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 624.
249. Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d 426 (N.Y.
1991).
250. See, e.g., Republic of Turkey v. Metro, Museum of Art, 762 F.Supp.
44, 46 (S.D.N.Y.1990); Grosz v. Museum of Modern Art, 772 F. Supp. 2d 473,
483 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
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use of his property."2 51 The refusal need not be in words either, but
may consist of actions that are consistent with refusal.252
Should the Benin royal family choose to pursue an action for
replevin against the Metropolitan Museum of Art, it would have to
file suit within three years of receiving refusal from the museum
after making a specific demand for the return of the Benin cultural
property. While there have been numerous public requests for the
return of the Benin bronzes and ivories since at least the 1970s, it
is likely that the royal family would have to show that it made a
specific request directed at the museum. The case might have a
more favorable outcome in New York courts than anywhere else.
Under Lubell, even with knowledge, actual or imputed, of the
location of the stolen property, the case might still be considered
timely despite delay in making the request. Questions of diligence
in locating the property would be relevant in the context of a
laches defense; however, in that context, the museum would have
to show prejudice. The defense of laches is further discussed
below.
b. The Discovery Rule
The statute of limitations in Illinois for replevin actions is five
years after the cause of action accrues.253 While Illinois courts
recognize a demand and refusal rule in replevin cases, it is not a
substantive requirement that marks the accrual of the action.
Illinois courts do not require a demand, for example, in cases
where that demand may prove to be futile. 254 Nevertheless, in
September 2008, the Benin royal family wrote a letter to the Art
Institute of Chicago requesting restitution of some of the Benin
bronzes held in the museum's collection. 255 The letter came as the
Art Institute of Chicago was hosting a travelling exhibit of Benin
251. Grosz, 772 F. Supp. 2d at 483 (emphasis in original).
252. Id. at 483-84.
253. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/13-205 (West 2012).
254. Carroll v. Curry, 912 N.E.2d 276 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009).
255. Letter from Edun Agharese Akenzua to the Art Institute of Chicago
(Sept. 8, 2008), availableat http://www.modernghana.com/GhanaHome/image
preview2.asp?img=ZWR1bl9sZXROZXIlLmpwZw=&t (last visited Apr. 30,
2012).
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art from various museums in Europe; the exhibit was titled Benin 2 56
Kings and Rituals: Royal Arts from Nigeria.
The 2008 letter would likely qualify as a specific demand. Since
the Art Institute of Chicago did not respond to the demand, its
actions might be considered a refusal that should have prompted
the royal family to file suit for replevin. At that point, the royal
family's action accrued, and the clock likely began to run on the
statute of limitations. If the regular statutory provisions of the
Illinois replevin statute apply, then unless the royal family files
suit before September 2013, the statute of limitations would
probably run against the Art Institute of Chicago due to the letter
mentioned above.
However, under the discovery rule, the five-year statute of
limitation could also have started to run when the royal family first
discovered the location of the bronzes and ivories in the
collections of the Field Museum and the Art Institute of Chicago.
This likely occurred before 2008 because both the Art Institute and
the Field Museum displayed their collections before this date;
therefore, the five year statute of limitations would have passed by
now. Because Illinois courts have at times applied the discovery
rule,257 it is possible that they would follow that rule in determining
when the cause of action accrued. The discovery rule, as first
articulated in O'Keeffe v. Snyder, is used to toll the statute of
limitations until the injured party discovers, or by exercise of
reasonable diligence and intelligence should have discovered, facts
which form the basis of a cause of action.258
In O'Keeffe, the plaintiff, artist Georgia O'Keeffe, contended
that three of her paintings, Cliffs, Seaweed, and Fragments were
stolen in 1946 from a gallery operated by her late husband, Alfred
Stieglitz. 259 According to O'Keeffe, she and Stieglitz discovered
Cliffs missing from the wall of an exhibit in March 1946.260 About
two weeks later, O'Keeffe noticed that two other paintings were

256. Rituals at Court, ART INST. CHI., http://www.artic.edu/aic/
collections/exhibitions/benin/rituals (last visited Mar. 10, 2013).
257. See Mucha v. King, 792 F.2d 602, 611 (7th Cir. 1986).
258. O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862 (N.J. 1980).
259. Id. at 865.
260. Id.

https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol23/iss2/5

42

Kiwara-Wilson: Restituting Colonial Plunder: The Case for the Benin Bronzes and

2013]

BENIN BRONZES

417

missing from a storage room."' O'Keeffe did not tell anyone,
even Stieglitz, about the missing paintings. 26 2 Though O'Keeffe
suspected a particular person of the thefts, neither she nor Stieglitz
confronted that person.263
There was no evidence of a break-in at the gallery on the dates
when O'Keeffe discovered the disappearance of her paintings, and
neither Stieglitz nor O'Keeffe reported the paintings missing to
any law enforcement agency.264 Similarly, neither O'Keeffe nor
Stieglitz advertised the loss of the paintings in Art News or any
other publication.2 65 O'Keeffe and Stieglitz discussed the thefts
with associates in the art world, including the director of the Art
Institute of Chicago, but did not ask them to do anything.266 In
1947, after her husband's death, O'Keeffe retained the services of
Doris Bry, to help settle her husband's estate.267 O'Keeffe declined
Bry's initial advice to report the theft of the paintings; however, in
1972, O'Keeffe authorized Bry to report the theft to the Art
Dealers Association of America, Inc., which maintained a registry
of stolen paintings.268
In September 1975, O'Keeffe learned that the paintings were on
consignment in the Andrew Crispo Gallery in New York.269 On
February 11, 1976, O'Keeffe discovered that Ulrich A. Frank had
sold the three paintings to Barry Snyder.270 O'Keeffe demanded
that the paintings be returned; following Snyder's refusal,
O'Keeffe instituted an action for replevin.2 7' Frank received the
paintings from his father, who died in 1968.272 Frank did not know
how his father came to possess the paintings, but he stated he saw

261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.

Id.
Id.
Id.
O'Keeffe, 416 A.2d at 865-66.
Id. at 866.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
O'Keeffe, 416 A.2d at 866.
Id.
Id.
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them in his father's apartment as early as 1941-1943.273 While
conceding the paintings were stolen for purposes of a summary
judgment proceeding, Snyder argued that O'Keeffe's action was
barred by the statute of limitations.274
Applying New Jersey law, the trial court found that O'Keeffe's
cause of action accrued in March 1946, the time of the alleged
theft, and concluded that her action was barred.2 75 The Appellate
Division found that "an action might have accrued more than six
years before the date of suit if possession by the defendant or his
predecessors satisfied the elements of adverse possession. "276
However, the Appellate Division concluded that "Snyder had not
established those elements, and that O'Keeffe's action was not
barred by the statute of limitations."2 77 On appeal, the Supreme
Court of New Jersey applied the discovery rule, characterizing it as
a principle of equity meant to "mitigate unjust results that
otherwise might flow from strict adherence to a rule of law."2 78
The court held that O'Keeffe's cause of action accrued when she
first knew, or reasonably should have known through the exercise
of due diligence, of the cause of action, including the identity of
the possessor of the paintings.2 79 The court then remanded the case
for a determination of how the discovery rule was applicable in
O'Keeffe's case.280 The court stressed that, on remand, the trial
court should consider O'Keeffe's diligence in searching for the
paintings, considering the avenues for reporting the thefts available
at the time.28' However, the case settled before it was retried and,
therefore, a court never made a determination of whether or not
O'Keeffe had acted with reasonable due diligence.2 82
The Seventh Circuit, applying Indiana law, adopted this
discovery rule in Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.

Id.
Id
Id. at 868.
O'Keeffe, 416 A.2d at 868.
Id.
Id. at 869.
Id. at 870.
Id.
Id.

282.

GERSTENBLITH, supra note 157, at 450.
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Cyprus v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts.283 In that case, the
Kanakaria Church in Cyprus was looted of some mosaics
following the Turkish invasion of Northern Cyprus in 1974.284
After the invasion, the government of the Republic of Cyprus
received reports from the occupied area that several churches had
been looted and destroyed, and that many mosaics had been stolen
or destroyed.285 Sometime between August 1976 and October
1979, the interior of the Kanakaria Church was vandalized, and the
mosaics were forcibly removed from the apse of the church.286 The
mosaics were severely damaged during their removal.28 7
The Republic of Cyprus' Department of Antiquities first learned
that the Kanakaria mosaics were missing in November of 1979.288
Immediately upon learning that the mosaics were missing, Cyprus
contacted the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization ("UNESCO") to inform it of the significance of the
lost art, and to seek its assistance.289 Thereafter, Cyprus notified
several people and entities that it believed could assist in
disseminating information about the missing mosaics and
recovering them.290 Cyprus also notified the International Council
of Museums and the International Council of Museums and Sites
about the missing mosaics. 291 Cyprus introduced a resolution
concerning the missing mosaics to Europa Nostra, a European
organization interested in the conservation of the architectural
heritage of Europe.292 Furthermore, Cyprus sent the Europa Nostra
resolution to the Council of Europe, which it believed would give
wide publicity to the problem.293

283. Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg &
Feldman Fine Arts, Inc., 917 F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1990).
284. Id. at 280-81.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 281.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus, 917 F.2d at 281.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id.
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Additionally, Cyprus contacted both European and American
museums about the missing mosaics.294 The Embassy of Cyprus in
Washington, D.C. issued press releases, and mailed information on
a routine basis concerning the loss of Cyprus's cultural property,
specifically the missing mosaics, to journalists, members of
Congress, and legislative assistants working in foreign affairs. 295
The information was also available to academics, archaeologists,
and those in organizations that expressed an interest in Greek and
Cypriot affairs.296 In addition, the information disseminated by the
Embassy of Cyprus included speeches given around the world by
Greek Cypriot officials asking for assistance in recovering the
mosaics.297 As a result of these efforts, the Republic of Cyprus
located the mosaics in 1988, while the defendant Goldberg was
trying to sell them after acquiring them in Europe.298
Because jurisdiction in the case was based on diversity, the
Seventh Circuit applied Indiana law on replevin.29 9 Following an
analysis of long-standing Indiana law, as well as O'Keeffe v.
Snyder, the court held that the plaintiffs action was timely.300 The
court concluded that the Kanakaria Church and the Republic of
Cyprus had been diligent in their search, and the statute of
limitations was therefore tolled until they discovered, or were
reasonably on notice of, the mosaics' location.30'
The circumstances of the theft in the cases above differ from the
situation of the theft of the Benin objects. Nevertheless, the
discovery rule relies heavily on the conduct of the original owner
in trying to locate and recover their property. The rule requires
that the original possessor was diligent in both the search for and
the attempts to recover the property. In the Benin case, the court
would have to begin with a determination of when the royal family
knew, or should have known, of the American collections. The
294. Id.
295. Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus, 917 F.2d at 281.
296. Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg &
Feldman Fine Arts, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 1374, 1380 (S.D. Ind. 1989).
297. Id.
298. Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus, 917 F.2d at 281.
299. Id. at 286.
300. Id. at 290.
301. Id.
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court would then likely have to make a determination on whether it
was reasonable for the royal family not to pursue legal action
earlier. The discovery rule seems to be disadvantageous to the
royal family. At least as early as 2008, the family was aware of
the Art Institute of Chicago's collection. Even assuming that this
was the earliest notice they had of the collection, they have not
brought suit for recovery, and the statute of limitations will be up
in 2013.
It is unclear if the family has any notice of the Field Museum
collection, which is possibly less well known than the Art Institute
of Chicago's collection. Though there have been public requests
for the pieces, the royal family would have to explain what it did
specifically to locate the bronzes and ivories in the Field Museum
collection. Without any such diligence, the application of the
discovery rule to toll the statute of limitations would likely not
help the royal family's case. It is possible that courts would
require the diligence to rise to the level of that in the Kanakaria
mosaics case.
c. Laches
In addition to the statute of limitations, another obstacle that the
Benin royal family may face in a legal claim against the American
museums is the defense of laches. Laches is an equitable
affirmative defense with two elements: (1) the unreasonable delay
by a victim; and (2) prejudice caused by the unreasonable delay.302
Laches is based on the notion that courts are reluctant to aid a
plaintiff who has "knowingly slept on his rights.""'
What constitutes an unreasonable delay depends on a court's
fact-based inquiry into a case. Courts have found delays ranging
from twenty to seventy years reasonable because of the
circumstances of each case.304 For the royal family, the initial
reason for delay may have been colonial rule; but since Nigeria
was granted independence in 1960, the reasonableness of their
delay since then is highly questionable. Though there may be
302. Tully v. State, 574 N.E.2d 659, 662 (111. 1991).
303. Id.
304. See, e.g., Vineberg v. Bissonnette, 548 F.3d 50 (1st Cir. 2008).
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many different reasons for delay, a plaintiff's lack of funds to file a
lawsuit may not be considered an effective excuse for
unreasonable delay.305 It is unclear how a court would view the
potential explanation that the royal family was pursuing diplomatic
avenues to recovery. But since these diplomatic efforts would
have likely proved ineffective in recovering property from private
museums, the delay in filing suit due to this reason would seem
unreasonable.
A court faced with the determination of unreasonableness in the
delay would also likely look at the manner in which the American
museums acquired their collections. Most acquisitions were made
through donations from wealthy patrons who purchased the
bronzes and ivories in Europe. Currently, a diligent search for
bronzes in the publicly available databases of the Metropolitan
Museum of Art306 and the Art Institute of Chicago307 reveals that
they openly list the acquisition of the pieces and trace provenance
to the 1897 looting. However, these databases have only been
established somewhat recently.30 8 Therefore, the royal family
might have a convincing argument that since the pieces were in
private collections and then donated privately to museums, they
did not have a way to find the bronzes or ivories in American
museums.
Furthermore, unlike the cases of Nazi-stolen art, there is no
database of stolen or plundered cultural property taken in colonial
times where the royal family could have registered their loss.
After independence, there were no tribunals to adjudicate the royal
family's claims. The arenas in which the royal family could have
305. See, e.g., Sanchez v. Trustees of the Univ. of Pennsylvania, 04 CIV.
1253 (JSR), 2005 WL 94847 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2004).
306. Search the Collections: Benin Bronzes, METRO. MUSEUM ART,
http://www.metmuseum.org/collections/search-thecollections?ft=Benin+Bronzes&amp;noqs=true (last visited Mar. 10, 2013).
307.
Search
Collection
Results,
ART
INST.
CHI.,
(last visited
http://www.artic.edu/aic/collections/artwork-search/results/benin
Mar. 10, 2013).
308. The Art Institute of Chicago's online database was established in 2008.
See Blair Kamin, Art Institute Puts Inland Architect Image Database Online,
CHI. TRIB., Apr. 05, 2011, http://featuresblogs.chicagotribune.com/theskyline
/2011/04/art-institute-puts-inland-architect-image-database-online.html.
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listed the loss of their cultural property were therefore severely
limited. By the time Nigeria was independent, most of the bronzes
and ivories had already been sold, and some even donated to
museums. These sales and donations may have made it harder to
track individual pieces, a task also complicated by the lack of
written records of what was taken by the British. It is therefore
hard to point to what the royal family might have been required to
do in order to be considered diligent. After all, the standard is not
whether they did everything that might have been done with the
benefit of hindsight, but whether their efforts were reasonable
given their circumstances.309
The second prong of the laches defense requires a show of
prejudice suffered by the current possessor. Typically, the kind of
prejudice that will support a laches defense arises out of a loss of
evidence, the unavailability of important witnesses, the
conveyance of the property in dispute for fair market value to a
bona fide purchaser, or the expenditure of resources in reliance
upon the status quo ante."o Therefore, prejudice in this context is
normally either evidence-based or expectations-based."'
The
evidence-based inquiry generally includes a requirement on the
part of the defendant to show that they would not be able to prove
their case due to lack of evidence caused by the passage of time.3 2
However, in order to show prejudice, the current possessor has to
be able to point to specific missing evidence necessary to prove
her claim, or specific unavailable witnesses, and what they would
have testified to."' As one court has put it, "proving prejudice
requires more than the frenzied brandishing of a cardboard sword;
it requires at least a hint of what witnesses or evidence a timeous
investigation might have yielded."314
In the potential Benin case, the key issues of facts of original
ownership and the British punitive expedition are established
historical facts that would be of little contention. The major

309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.

Lubell, 550 N.Y.S.2d 618 at 619.
Id. at 57.
Id.
Id. at 58.
Id.
Id.
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difficulty would be in proving theft or pillage, as opposed to spoils
of war, under international law. Since this is not a question of fact,
a museum asserting a laches defense would likely have a hard time
pointing to specific evidence that they are denied due to the royal
family's delay. Once again, it would seem that New York would
therefore be the most favorable forum for the royal family's action
in replevin.
IV. CONCLUSION

In 1979, a Nigerian filmmaker, Eddie Ugbomah, produced a
movie entitled The Mask."' The movie was loosely based on the
British looting of Benin City, and the British Museum's
acquisition of the Queen Idia mask. In the movie, Ugbomah's
protagonist is a Nigerian James Bond,316 who, at Nigeria's request,
manages to steal the mask from the British Museum. It has been a
hundred and fifteen years since Benin City was invaded and
looted. Since independence, Nigeria has attempted to recover the
cultural property of Benin by relying mainly on failed diplomatic
efforts. While sending a secret agent to steal back the collections
of western museums is clearly not a good idea, neither, it seems, is
the diplomatic approach. A new approach is needed.
One can only speculate as to what approach might be effective.
Though the royal family, and indeed the nation of Nigeria, might
have a strong moral claim for restitution, museums and private
collectors have not made gestures to indicate they would restitute
any pieces without the force of legal authority. However, while
the legal approach has worked for cases of Nazi-restitution, it may
not be effective for the Benin case. Too much time has passed,
and as discussed above, the royal family would run into several
issues in proving its case. Nevertheless, the Benin royal family
might attempt the legal approach, even without complete assurance
of success, in an effort to incentivize the museums to negotiate.
The American Museums might want to avoid the cost and
publicity of a lawsuit, and may be willing to negotiate with the
royal family, which may lead to some pieces being returned to the
315.

RUSSELL CHAMBERLIN, LOOT! THE HERITAGE OF PLUNDER 191

(1983).

316. Id.
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Nigerian people. However, this approach is unlikely because the
legal case for restitution is weak.
Another approach that Nigeria may use to attempt to force
western museums to negotiate is to use other Nigerian artifacts that
are well sought out in the west. As has been suggested in the call
for the return of illicit Turkish antiquities,"' Nigerian museums
might attempt to restrict or deny loans of other works to universal
museums in collaborative exhibitions. The Nigerian government,
through its museums, could condition the loan of other Nigerian
cultural artifacts to western museums on the reciprocal loan of
Benin artifacts to Nigerian museums. While this may only be a
small incentive, it may prove effective in at least sparking
negotiations. Although this approach would not lead to a
permanent transfer of title to the royal family or the Nigerian
government, it would allow the Benin bronzes and ivories to return
home. The benefit to the western museums would be access to
more artifacts that they may argue, under cultural nationalism, are
unfairly retained. Ultimately, the return of the Benin bronzes and
ivories to Nigeria, even if on temporary or permanent loan, would
allow the Nigerian people to commune with their cultural property
by giving more people access.
Salome Kiwara-Wilson*

317.

See Martin Bailey, Turkey Blocks Loans to U.S. and U.K., ART
Mar. 1, 2012, http://www.theartnewspaper.com/articles/Turkeyblocks-loans-to-US-and-UK/25869.
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